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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps one of the world’s greatest mysteries is what ingredients
comprise the recipe for Coca-Cola. This recipe sits in a vault in Atlanta,
Georgia with a palm scanner, numerical code, and large steel door.1 Once
inside the vault, there is another safe box and metal case that store what the
owners call “the most guarded trade secret in the world.”2 Only two senior
executives know the recipe at any given time, and they are not allowed to
travel on the same plane.3 The great lengths Coca-Cola goes through to
guard its secret recipe indicate the importance of protecting trade secrets.
Recently, there has been an increase in attempted trade secret thefts,
especially as technology advances. In 2010, a research chemist stole trade
secrets worth $400 million and passed them to a Chinese university.4 In
2011, a former Ford employee copied over four thousand documents worth
$50 million onto a hard drive.5 In 2012, a former General Motors employee
was found guilty of trying to pass trade secrets related to hybrid cars to a
Chinese automobile company.6 Theft of trade secrets costs U.S. companies
billions of dollars every year.7 These instances are just a few of the
examples that prompted both the United States and the European Union (EU)
to draft and adopt trade secret legislation.
The object of this Note is to understand the similarities and differences
between recent trade secret legislation passed in the United States and the
EU. Both pieces of legislation seek to obtain similar trade secret protection
between the two major economies. Although the EU and United States have
passed similar measures to protect trade secrets, trade secret protection
remains stronger in the United States.
This Note will first analyze the history of trade secret protection in both
the United States and the EU. This Note will then look at the similarities and
differences between the recently enacted legislation in the United States and
the EU. Next, it analyzes the differences in the effects of the United States’

1
Ivana Kottoasova, Does Formula Mystery Help Keep Coke Afloat?, CNN (Feb. 19,
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/18/business/coca-cola-secret-formula/.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING
THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 5 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/9383
21/download.
5
Id. at 8.
6
Id. at 11.
7
BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43174, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS:
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R4
3714.pdf.
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legislation and the EU’s directive. Finally, this Note will consider whether
the legislation will lead to uniformity in trade secret protection in both
jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND ON TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the trade secrets legislation
in each world power, it is important to understand the trade secret protections
that already existed in both the United States and the EU. Many states in the
United States adopted similar provisions for trade secret protection, whereas
many countries in the EU had extremely different, or non-existent,
approaches to trade secret protection.8 This section will explore the concept
of a trade secret and the type of information that qualifies as a trade secret.
This section will then explore the history of trade secret protection in the
United States as a source for comparing the recently adopted legislation.
Subsequently, this section will explain trade secret protection as it exists in
the EU as foundation to analyze the effects of the recently adopted
legislation.
A. What is a Trade Secret and Why Do They Matter?
The first element of analyzing trade secret legislation is defining a trade
secret. According to the Restatement of Torts, “[a] trade secret may consist
of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used
in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.”9 A trade secret is typically “a
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business” that
relates to the production of goods.10 Trade secrets can include “customer
lists, proprietary technologies, formulas and codes, manufacturing processes,
recipes . . . sensitive product and marketing plans, research and development,
and other business information” that can provide a competitive advantage
because of its confidentiality.11 These examples of trade secrets derive their
value not only from the information itself but also the secrecy of the
information.12 Trade secrets are important because they help companies
8
Natalja Sosnova, EU Directive Proposal: Trade Secrets, 20 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
45, 47 (2016).
9
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
10
Id.
11
3M et al., Letter from 36 Organizations with an Interest in Trade Secret Protection to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0616/s70616-352.pdf [hereinafter Hearings from Organizations].
12
Id.
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distinguish themselves from competitors and create advantages in the
industry.13 If a competitor acquires a company’s trade secret, that company
loses the value of its secret and the competitor gains an advantage by having
access to information they did not develop, thereby eliminating the trade
secret owner’s incentive to invest in innovations.14
The importance of trade secrets has grown in the global economy.
Though it is difficult to value just how much trade secrets are worth, 81% of
the total value of S&P 500 companies can be attributed to intangible assets
like trade secrets and other forms of intellectual property.15 A primary
reason for the growing importance of trade secrets is new technology.16 In
today’s world, a thief can simply upload files onto a hard drive and deliver
that information anywhere in the world, rather than stealing physical files or
prototypes. Trade secret theft is also growing because hackers have the
ability to access confidential company information17 which has become a
growing concern because some developing countries use trade secret theft as
a means of economic growth.18 Additionally, trade secrets are rising in
importance precisely because of the term’s broad definition—the definition
is “perfectly suited to the evolutionary . . . and revolutionary . . . nature of
innovation.”19 Finally, trade secrets are attractive to companies because they
are less costly than patents and require less formality.20 Companies risk
losing their patent information if their application is denied by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, but they do not risk losing their trade secret
because it is not on the application.21
B. History of Trade Secret Protection in the United States
The United States has a strong background in intellectual property and the
protection of trade secrets. Historically, the U.S. government gave patents
and copyrights stronger protection than trade secrets; however, in 1939, trade
13
Daliah Saper, Confidential Information: The Importance of Keeping Trade Secrets,
BUSINESS.COM (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.business.com/legal/the-importance-of-keeping-sec
rets-trade-secrets-that-is/.
14
Hearings from Organizations, supra note 11.
15
David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1093 (2012).
16
Id. at 1098–1101.
17
Id. at 1100.
18
Id. at 1110.
19
Id. at 1008.
20
Id. at 1116.
21
Id. at 1115–16. “A regular US Patent application will be published eighteen months after
filing. If . . . a patent application . . . does not mature into an issued patent, they have neither
trade secret nor patent protection.”
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secrets entered the intellectual property scene when the Restatement of Torts
addressed trade secrets in two sections.22 In particular, companies used trade
secret law to protect information that was outside the scope of traditional
intellectual property law23 or to avoid the disclosure of patented information
after twenty years.24 Another advantage to trade secret protection is that it is
easier, quicker, and cheaper to obtain compared to patent protection.25
The increased use of trade secrets led to the publication of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in 1979 to facilitate uniform trade secret
protection among states.26 Forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA.27 The
UTSA was published by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law with the intent “to codify the basic principles of common
law trade secrets protection” and promote uniformity, simplicity, and fairness
in the resolution of trade secret issues.28 Under the UTSA, information
qualifies as a trade secret if three requirements are met: (1) it must be
information; (2) it must “have actual or potential ‘independent economic
value’ stemming from its secrecy”; and, (3) it must have “been the object of
reasonable efforts designed to maintain its secrecy.”29 The UTSA guidelines
provide that a trade secret owner has no remedy unless the secret has been
misappropriated.30
Misappropriation under the UTSA occurs when
information is obtained by improper means including: theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain
secrecy or espionage.31 According to the UTSA, a trade secret owner may
receive injunctive relief and damages if their trade secret is
misappropriated.32
A trade secret owner may bring an action for
misappropriation within three years after the misappropriation was
discovered or should have been discovered.33 Thus, the UTSA provides a
way for trade secret owners to ensure uniformity in the protection of trade
22

YEH, supra note 7.
Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage in the United
States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret Protection, 27 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 95, 100–101 (2001).
24
YEH, supra note 7.
25
Id.
26
Rosaria A. Suriano & Mark A. Fantin, Protecting Your Business Assets, INDUSTRYWEEK
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.industryweek.com/intellectual-property/protecting-your-busines
s-assets.
27
Id.
28
Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 284 (1980).
29
Id. at 285.
30
Id. at 293.
31
Id. at 294.
32
Id. at 301.
33
Id. at 306.
23
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secrets from state to state. Overall, the UTSA has been widely accepted
based on the fact that only New York and Massachusetts have not adopted
the Act.34 However, it is important to note that though the UTSA provides a
strong foundation for the protection of trade secrets, it is only applicable in
state courts or federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction.35
While the UTSA permitted trade secret owners to have a civil remedy
against trade secret misappropriation in state court, the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996 (EEA) made trade secret misappropriation a federal crime.36
Congress passed the EEA due to concerns that foreign countries were
stealing trade secrets from American companies, thereby reducing American
economic power.37 Prior to the EEA’s enactment, prosecutors brought trade
secret theft charges under mail fraud statutes.38
The EEA was the first criminal law in the United States to protect trade
secrets. The EEA criminalizes the theft of trade secrets for the benefit of a
foreign entity or with an intention to confer an economic benefit to another
party.39 Only intentional violations of trade secret theft are punishable under
the EEA.40 Penalties under the EEA include a maximum prison sentence of
fifteen years and a maximum fine of $500,000 for an individual.41 An
organization that violates the law could receive a maximum fine of $10
million.42
C. History of Trade Secret Protection in the European Union
In contrast with the United States’ fairly uniform application of trade
secret law due to most states’ adoption of the UTSA, a 2013 study found no
uniform definition of trade secrets among the European Union’s member
states.43 Each of the twenty-eight member states has a different definition of
“trade secret” and different protections for trade secrets, but the Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection
34
Suriano & Fantin, supra note 26; Trade Secrets Act Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM LAW
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Oct.
25, 2017).
35
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.02 (2015).
36
Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2017).
37
Robin L. Kuntz, Cyberlaw: How Not to Catch A Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act
Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 901, 902–03 (2013).
38
Id. at 904.
39
YEH, supra note 7.
40
Van Arnam, supra note 23, at 110.
41
Kuntz, supra note 37, at 906.
42
Id. at 907.
43
For the purposes of this Note, the United Kingdom is analyzed as a part of the European
Union as the withdrawal was not yet complete.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SHHH! IT’S A SECRET

4/18/2018 9:21 AM

487

of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets)
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure (Directive) aims to
change this disjunction.44
Historically, the common view was that trade secrets did not deserve the
same level of protection as other intellectual property rights.45 A European
Commission report showed that fewer trade secret actions were heard by the
courts than patent or other intellectual property cases.46 The United
Kingdom’s Ministry of Justice stated that there were 95 trade secret cases in
2009 compared to 146 trademark cases, 130 patent cases, and 120 copyright
cases.47 Further, the European Commission was more concerned with
encouraging competition than securing the rights of companies regarding
trade secrets.48 Thus, even though there were trade secret standards around
the EU, the standards were ignored which led to weak trade secret protection
measures.49
The present disjunction in trade secret protection causes concern because
it leads to barriers to trade and distortion of competition.50 For instance,
various jurisdictions refer to trade secrets using different terms including:
know-how, confidential information, or business secret.51 There is little
agreement as to the meanings of each these terms, which can create
confusion as to what qualifies as a trade secret.52 Further, different countries
may deem the theft of trade secrets as a civil or criminal offense or both.53
For instance, in France, the criminal code has had provisions related to the
theft of trade secrets since 1844.54 On the other hand, Ireland and the U.K.
do not have any criminal provisions on trade secret infringement.55
Moreover, some EU member states lack any remedy for trade-secret theft.56
44

Sosnova, supra note 8, at 47.
Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 208–09 (2008).
46
HOGAN LOVELLS INT’L, LLP, REPORT ON TRADE SECRETS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION:
STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND PARASITIC COPYING (LOOK-ALIKES), at 41, MARKT/2010/20/D
(Sept. 23, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/120113_
study_en.pdf [hereinafter REPORT].
47
Id.
48
Czapracka, supra note 45, at 209.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 229.
51
Id. at 230.
52
Id. at 231.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 213, 234.
56
Frequently Asked Questions: Protection Against the Unlawful Acquisition of Undisclosed
Know-how Business Information (Trade Secrets), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/gro
wth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-secrets/faq_en (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
45
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There are also differences in national legislation as to why a person may
bring a claim for the theft of a trade secret. Only Germany and Poland
require that a trade secret holder “have a justifiable interest to keep the
information secret, which is assessed in relation to the relevance of the
subject of the secret for the competitiveness of the enterprise.”57
Additionally, there are differences in legal procedures. For instance,
Belgium requires a written pleading communicating that the information is a
trade secret, which serves as a deterrent for those seeking to bring a trade
secret action unless the information is already generally known.58 Belgium
illustrates that there is a dearth of protection from the disclosure of trade
secrets in the courts of European Union member States.
Though there is widespread fragmentation, some similarities exist among
those countries that do have trade secret laws in the EU. In general, the
information is required to be secret, and the owner is required to maintain
efforts to keep the information secret.59 If a third party can easily discover
the information, it is not protectable.60 The trade secret owner should intend
to maintain the secrecy of the information.61 Finally, there must be a link
between the trade secret and an economic advantage.62 The trade secret does
not need to be patentable, although some jurisdictions do require the trade
secret to be “novel.”63
Key elements of a trade secret include the confidentiality of information
and the owner’s efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information.64
Countries that do not formally define “trade secret” use a multitude of factors
to determine if the information is a trade secret.65 Only one country has
legislation wholly dedicated to trade secrets, whereas some jurisdictions
protect trade secrets using the law of unfair competition.66 Most countries

Frequently Asked Questions]. Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
and Sweden have legislation on the misappropriation of trade secrets, though Germany, Finland,
Greece, Denmark, and Spain do not define “trade secret.” Id. Belgium, France, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and the U.K. have no specific provision on trade secrets in
state law. Id. In Cyprus, trade secrets are only protected by contract. Id. In France, the theft of
manufacturing secrets are criminally punished if committed by employees. Id.
57
Czapracka, supra note 45, at 234.
58
REPORT, supra note 46.
59
Czapracka, supra note 45, at 234.
60
Id. at 234–35.
61
Id. at 235.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 234–35.
64
REPORT, supra note 46.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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have criminal sanctions against trade secret infringement and provide for the
protection of trade secrets by contractual obligations.67 While most states
offer injunctions and damages, the remedies vary from state to state
depending on the cause of action.68 Further, some countries do not issue
orders protecting trade secret information because the protection can last
forever, thereby broadening intellectual property rights.69 Finally, it has
historically been difficult for plaintiffs to get into the court because claimants
could not prove that the information was stolen.70
The European Commission created a directive partially due to a recent
study showing that 75% of companies stated that trade secrets are important
for competitiveness and innovative performance.71 The lack of consistent
trade secret laws discourages cross-border research and development;
companies refrain from sharing trade secrets; and few companies seek legal
remedies after they are a victim of trade secret misappropriation.72 The
statistics indicated that it was clearly time for a change in the European
Union. The European Commission cited company requests for coherent
legal protection against the unlawful acquisition of trade secrets as a primary
reason for the legislation.73 Further, in the past ten years, one in five
European companies suffered from at least one misappropriation attempt,74
and many of those respondents likely did not seek redress because of
fragmentation in trade secret laws. These companies also indicated that the
danger of misappropriation was increasing.75 Of the 140 companies that
reported attempts or acts of misappropriation, only 40.7% sought remedies in
EU courts.76 The primary reasons for failing to do so were collecting
evidence, reputation, and litigation costs.77

67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market, 13
(Apr. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/130711_fi
nal-study_en.pdf [hereinafter Study]. These responses were based on a survey with “a
stratified sample encompassing large, medium, and small firms belonging to a wide range of
business sectors.” Id. at 12. Overall, a total of 537 responses to the survey were received from
EU firms. Id.
75
Id. at 13.
76
Id.
77
Id. Of 140 companies surveyed, 43% stated difficulty in collecting evidence, 30% stated
reputation, and 30% stated reputation costs.
68
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Though each jurisdiction has unique trade secret laws, there are basic
principles that apply to all EU states. First, several different types of
information are eligible for trade secret protection.78 Many states do not
include definitions in their trade secrets legislation, though it is generally
understood to mean information including technical or non-technical data,
patterns, compilations, programs, devices, methods, techniques, financial
data, customer lists, or supplies that have economic value as the information
is not generally known to third parties and secrecy is maintained due to the
owner’s efforts.79
III. OVERVIEW OF THE TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE AND DEFEND TRADE
SECRETS ACT
The European Commission proposed the Trade Secrets Directive on
November 28, 2013, and on June 8, 2016 the European Union adopted the
Directive.80 The Directive requires all member states to create legislation
that aligns with the Directive within two years from the adoption date.81 The
Directive is “applicable when the appropriation, use or disclosure of trade
secrets is done without the consent of the trade secret holder and through the
use of dishonest means, breach of law, or breach of contract.”82 Further, it is
important for companies “from different EU countries to build trusted
networks for collaborative research or to enter into know-how transfer
agreements” which can only be done by repairing the fragmented system of
trade secret laws.83
A. European Union Trade Secrets Directive
On June 8, 2016, the European Parliament and Council adopted a
Directive called Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of
the Council on 8 June 2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and
Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition,
Use, and Disclosure (Trade Secrets Directive).84 The rationale behind the
78

REPORT, supra note 46.
Id.
80
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56.
81
See Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016
on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets)
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure 2016 O.J. (L 157) 18 [hereinafter
Trade Secrets Directive].
82
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56.
83
Id.
84
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81.
79
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Trade Secrets Directive was to limit European companies’ increasing
exposure to the misappropriation of trade secrets.85 The Directive does not
establish criminal sanctions, but harmonizes the civil remedies available to a
trade secret owner including:
stopping the unlawful use and further disclosure of
misappropriated trade secrets[;] the removal from the market of
goods that have been manufactured on the basis of a trade
secret that has been illegally acquired[;] the right to
compensation for the damages caused by the unlawful use or
disclosure of the misappropriated trade secret.86
The Directive dictates that a trade secret has three components. First, it
should be a secret that is not generally known or readily accessible by people
that usually deal with the information in question.87 Second, it should have
commercial value derived from the fact that it is a secret.88 Finally, the trade
secret holder should have taken reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the
information.89
The Directive prohibits the unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure of
trade secrets. It is unlawful for a person to use or disclose a trade secret if
they know or should have known that the trade secret was obtained directly
or indirectly from another person who unlawfully used or disclosed the trade
secret.90
The Directive also provides for the preservation of confidentiality of trade
secrets in the course of legal proceedings. Member states must take specific
measures that are necessary to preserve the confidentiality of any trade secret
or alleged trade secret used or referred to in the course of legal proceedings.91
These protections include: restricting access to any document containing
trade secrets, restricting access to hearings when trade secrets may be
disclosed, limiting access to only certain people, and limiting a nonconfidential version of a judicial decision to only a specified number of
persons.92 The number of persons is limited to what is necessary to ensure
the right to an effective remedy and fair trial and must include at least one
85

Id. at 3.
Trade Secrets, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-proper
ty/trade-secrets_en (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
87
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 2.
88
Id. at 4.
89
Id. at 7.
90
Id. at 10.
91
Id. at 5–6.
92
Id. at 6.
86
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natural person from each party and their respective lawyers.93 Exceptions to
trade secret protections occur when secrets are exposed as the result of
whistleblowing, conflicting with the right to freedom of expression, or when
the protections conflict with the functions of workers’ representatives.94
B. United States Defend Trade Secrets Act
On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed Public Law 114-153. The
Public Law, which amends Chapter 90 of Title 18 of the United States Code
(Economic Espionage Act), is called the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
(DTSA).95 In a rare showing of bipartisanship, the Senate unanimously
passed the bill in a vote of 87–0 on April 4, 2016. The bill passed the House
410–2.96 Under the DTSA, the owner of a trade secret may bring a civil
action if the trade secret is misappropriated and the trade secret is related to a
product or service that is used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign
commerce.97 President Obama explained that the bill serves to prevent
competitors from stealing trade secrets from American companies, which
costs the economy over $300 billion a year.98 The legislation expands the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.99 The DTSA enables trade secret owners
to bring trade secret lawsuits in a federal forum. Previously, owners were
limited to only state forums or federal courts in diversity.100
The DTSA is like the UTSA. The trade secret definition is very similar,
and the misappropriation definition is identical.101 Both the DTSA and
UTSA have a three-year statute of limitations following the discovery of
misappropriation.102 The DTSA does not preempt state law, and federal
court jurisdiction is not exclusive.103

93

Id.
Id. at 4–5.
95
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
96
REUTERS, Congress Just Passed Tough New Trade Secret Protection Legislation,
FORTUNE (Apr. 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/28/congress-trade-secret-legislation/.
97
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2016).
98
Gregory Korte, Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, Allowing Companies to Sue, USA
TODAY (May 11, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/11/obama-sign
s-trade-secrets-bill-allowing-companies-sue/84244258/.
99
Eric Goldman, The New ‘Defend Trade Secrets Act’ Is the Biggest IP Development in
Years, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/04/28/the-newdefend-trade-secrets-act-is-the-biggest-ip-development-in-years/#7946ea00a64f.
100
Id.; see also ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 13.02 (2015).
101
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985).
102
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 6 (amended 1985).
103
18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2016).
94
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However, the DTSA is also distinct from the UTSA in multiple ways.
First, the trade secret must satisfy the commerce clause, meaning that the
trade secret must be related to a product or service use in or intended for use
in interstate or foreign commerce.104 Second, the DTSA allows for ex parte
civil seizure.105 Third, the DTSA grants whistleblower immunity.106 Fourth,
the U.S. legislation requires employers to give notice of whistleblower
immunity, and finally, it applies to activity outside the United States.107
IV. COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TRADE SECRETS DIRECTIVE
AND THE UNITED STATES DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT
Both the European Union and the United States decided to implement
these trade secret measures because of the growing importance of trade
secret protection in the global economy. The nature of trade secrets requires
a common definition and protections, especially as trade secret
misappropriation is litigated in court.
Overall, the DTSA is comparable to the European Union Trade Secrets
Directive. Both have similar definitions of a trade secret with three
requirements. First, the information must be a secret meaning that it is not
generally known. The U.S. definition states that the information should not
be known to another person who can derive economic value from the
information,108 whereas the EU only requires that the information should not
be known within circles that deal with the kind of information in question.109
Second, the trade secret must have economic or commercial value.110
Finally, in order to be a trade secret, the owner or controller of the
information must take efforts to prevent others from obtaining the trade
secret information.111
In order for a trade secret to be misappropriated, both the DTSA and the
Directive require either wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure.112 Wrongful
acquisition occurs if someone acquires the trade secret information through
unauthorized access.
The DTSA describes this as “theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. § 1832(a).
Id. § 1836(b).
Id. § 1833(b); id. § 1837.
Id. § 1837.
Id. § 1839(3)(B).
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 4.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.
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secrecy, or espionage.”113 Both acts also state that the acquisition, use, or
disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful if one obtains the trade secret with
knowledge that the information was obtained from another person who was
using or disclosing the trade secret unlawfully.114 However, a person is
shielded from liability if he or she obtains the information without
knowledge that it was wrongfully acquired, according to both the DTSA and
the Directive.115
Wrongful use or disclosure occurs if one of three criteria are met. First,
wrongful use occurs if a person acquires a trade secret improperly or
unlawfully.116 It can also occur if a person obtains a trade secret despite a
duty to not disclose the secret, or, in other words, if a person has an
obligation to keep the information confidential or a duty to limit the trade
secret’s use.117 Third, wrongful use or disclosure can occur if a person
knowingly obtains a trade secret from a person who owed a duty to maintain
a trade secret’s confidentiality or limit its use.118
While both the DTSA and Directive seek to prevent the misappropriation
of trade secrets, both the United States and EU strive to maintain innovation.
As such, both pieces of legislation also define lawful means to acquire trade
secret information. The United States explicitly allows for reverse
engineering.119 Though the Directive does not explicitly use the words
“reverse engineering,” it does allow for “observation, study, disassembly or
testing of a product or object that has been made available to the public or
that is lawfully in the possession of the acquirer of the information who is
free from any legally valid duty to limit the acquisition of the trade secret.”120
Though the difference is subtle, the DTSA does not address whether a person
with access to the trade secret information could “reverse engineer” an item.
Further, both the DTSA and Directive allow for any independent discovery,
creation, or derivation of the trade secret information.121 This means that if a
person, through their own testing methods, developed an identical recipe for
Coca-Cola, the acquisition of that trade secret would be lawful.
The Directive goes a step further than the DTSA as to what types of trade
secret disclosures are lawful. The Directive states that it does not apply to
those who exercise the right to freedom of expression and information as set
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(A).
18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 6–7.
See 130 Stat. 376; Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 6–7.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(III); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B).
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 10.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 4.
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out in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights.122 It is not clear
what the freedom of expression and information covers; however, the text of
the Directive indicates that the Directive intends to protect “investigative
journalism and the protection of journalistic sources.”123 The Directive also
allows for the acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets if such action is
permitted by law.124 In particular, this provision applies to unions. Union
representatives should still be able to exercise their rights to information
according to the EU or the national laws of EU countries.125
Both regimes also allow for whistleblower protections, though again, the
Directive provides broader protections for whistleblowers. The DTSA only
protects a whistleblower if he discloses a trade secret “in confidence to a
Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to
an attorney.”126 The Directive protects any disclosure that “serves the public
interest” meaning the disclosure reveals “misconduct, wrongdoing, or illegal
activity.”127 The EU also allows for good faith immunity for whistleblowers
so long as they believe that they revealed misconduct, wrongdoing, or illegal
activity in furtherance of the public interest.128
Both the United States and EU also seek to protect employees through
their respective legislation. The DTSA prohibits injunctions that prevent
someone from entering into an employment relationship.129 In addition, if a
person has conditions placed on entering into an employment relationship,
those conditions can only be based on evidence of threatened
misappropriation, not solely an employee’s knowledge.130 Additionally,
conditions may not conflict with applicable state law that may prohibit
restraints on “the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”131 The
Directive provides even stronger protections for employees. First, the
122
123
124
125
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128
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130
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Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
The acquisition, use, or disclosure of trade secrets, whenever imposed or
permitted by law, should be treated as lawful for the purposes of this
Directive. This concerns, in particular, the acquisition and disclosure of trade
secrets in the context of the exercise of the rights of workers’ representatives
to information, consultation, and participation in accordance with Union law
and national laws and practices, and the collective defen[s]e of the interest of
workers and employees.
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(1)(A)(i).
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5.
Id. at 11.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I).
Id.
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II).
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Directive points out that it should not be used as a method to limit an
employee’s use of information that is not a trade secret.132 Next, the
Directive should not be used to limit an employee’s use of experience and
skills that were acquired throughout their course of employment.133 Finally,
the Directive should not be used to impose additional restrictions on an
employment contract, unless that restriction is imposed according to EU or
national law.134
The DTSA also provides anti-retaliation protection while the Directive
does not. The DTSA states that an individual may disclose a trade secret
after filing a lawsuit for retaliation by an employer if certain conditions are
met.135 The employee must file any document under seal and cannot disclose
the trade secret unless ordered by a court.136 Further, employers are required
to provide employees with notice of immunity.137
The laws diverge with regard to who can bring a claim for trade secret
misappropriation. The DTSA only allows for the owner to bring a claim.138
The Directive extends more broadly by allowing one who controls the
information to bring such a claim.139 Because the Directive applies to those
who control information, those in upper-level managerial positions may be
entitled to bring trade secret claims, in lieu of just the person that owns the
proprietary information. The broader standing for those who control
information may also include licensees of trade secret information.
The DTSA gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside
of the United States, as long as the person who misappropriated the
information is a U.S. citizen or entity.140 The Directive does not specify
whether it applies to extraterritorial conduct; however, EU member states
will likely be able to provide for broader national reach in their own national
laws.
Recognizing the importance of trade secrets, both the DTSA and
Directive seek to preserve the confidentiality of a trade secret throughout
litigation. This is a key factor that will encourage parties to bring trade
secret claims—otherwise, the legislation in both the United States and EU
would be futile. In the United States, the trade secret owner must be given
the opportunity to describe their interest in keeping information confidential
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(2).
Id. § 1833(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 1833(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 1836(b)(1).
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.
18 U.S.C. § 1837.
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before the court is able to authorize or direct disclosure of any information
that the owner asserts to be a trade secret.141 The Directive provides greater
detail about confidentiality measures. The Directive identifies specific
baseline measures that a court should consider to preserve confidentiality.142
These measures include restricting access to documents containing trade
secrets, restricting access to hearings where trade secrets may be disclosed
and corresponding transcripts, and limiting the number of people who can
access a non-confidential version of a judicial decision.143
The Directive also outlines factors that judicial authorities should
consider to determine which protective measures should be implemented.144
These eight factors are: (1) the value of trade secret; (2) the measures taken
to protect the trade secret; (3) the conduct used to acquire and to use the trade
secret; (4) the impact of unlawful use or disclosure of trade secret; (5) the
interest of parties; (6) the interests of third parties; (7) the public interest;
and, (8) the need to safeguard fundamental rights.145 Finally, the Directive
offers more specificity about who has access to information during legal
proceedings. In a trade secret proceeding, one natural person from each
party and their respective lawyers will have full access to evidence or
hearings.146 The DTSA provides no such specificity. Finally, the Directive
addresses the publication of judicial decisions after the case has been
decided.147 In any legal proceeding concerning the unlawful acquisition, use,
or disclosure of a trade secret, judicial authorities may order the
dissemination of information concerning the decision, which includes
publishing the decision in full or in part.148 Any publication must preserve
the confidentiality of trade secrets.149 The infringer bears the cost for
“dissemination of the information concerning the decision, including
publishing it in full or in part.”150 A court must take into account “the value
of the trade secret, the conduct of the infringer in acquiring, using or
disclosing the trade secret, the impact of the unlawful use or disclosure of the
trade secret, and the likelihood of further unlawful use or disclosure of the
trade secret by the infringer.”151 The Directive also aims to provide some
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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protection to the infringer if the information in the publication of the decision
would allow a natural person to be identified.152 In particular, the court will
take into account whether publication of the identifying information is
justified because the publication may cause harm to the privacy and
reputation of the infringer.
Both documents also allow for similar remedies for trade secret
misappropriation. Remedies can be either temporary or permanent.
Temporary remedies include the seizure of property and preliminary
injunctions. Both the DTSA and Directive allow for the seizure of infringing
goods.153 The EU defines infringing goods as goods whose design,
characteristics, functioning, manufacturing, and process of marketing
significantly benefit from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used, or
disclosed.154 The DTSA is unique from the Directive because it allows for
the ex parte seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or
dissemination of the trade secret only upon the proper showing by the trade
secret owner.155 Ex parte seizure only occurs in extraordinary circumstances,
and the trade secret owner must post bond.156 The Directive does not state
whether the seizure of infringing goods can be done ex parte. Further, the
DTSA allows for the seizure of any property “necessary to prevent the
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret,”157 whereas the Directive
only allows for the seizure of infringing goods.158 The seizure of property
under the DTSA is broader because it pertains to any documents that may
include trade secret information; whereas infringing goods are only those
produced using the trade secret itself.
Other temporary forms of relief in the EU and United States include
preliminary injunctions. The Directive specifically requires EU states to
allow “prohibition, offering, placing on the market or use of infringing
goods” under the sub-title of “Provisional and Precautionary measures.”159
The DTSA does not explicitly mention preliminary injunctions, however, an
ex parte seizure can only be ordered if equitable relief under Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is inadequate.160 This implies that
preliminary injunctions are a form of relief for trade secret misappropriation.
The Directive specifies that a court should take into account the eight factors
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 9.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 13.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 9.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(vi).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 13.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1838(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
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described above before issuing a preliminary injunction.161 A plaintiff must
meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction.162
Both the EU and the United States include limitations on preliminary
relief through bonds and time limitations. In the United States, an ex parte
seizure order or preliminary injunction requires the movant to post a bond.163
Similarly, in the EU, a movant may be required to post a security to ensure
that the respondent is compensated for any prejudice.164 Both jurisdictions
also impose time limits for judicial action for more permanent measures.165
In the EU, an applicant must institute legal proceedings leading to a decision
on the merits within either twenty working days or thirty-one calendar days,
whichever is longer.166 In the United States, after an ex parte seizure order,
the court must set a date for a hearing no later than seven days after the order
is issued, unless there is consent from the respondent to delay.167
The DTSA places particular emphasis on the criteria surrounding the
seizure of property related to the trade secret. If a trade secret has been
misappropriated, a court can issue an order for the civil seizure of property
necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of information that is
the subject of the action.168 In order to issue a civil seizure, the court must
find that another form of equitable relief would be inadequate, an immediate
and irreparable injury will occur if the seizure is not ordered, and the harm of
denying the seizure outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the
person against whom seizure would be ordered and substantially outweighs
the harm to any third parties who may be harmed by such seizure.169 The
court must also find that the applicant is likely to show that the information
is a trade secret and that the person against whom seizure would be ordered
misappropriated the trade secret of the applicant by improper means or
conspired to use improper means to misappropriate the trade secret, and that

161

Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 15.
See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” States interpret these
requirements differently with some states requiring all four criteria, whereas some states use a
sliding scale. Id. at 51.
163
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(vi).
164
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14.
165
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(v); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14.
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Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14.
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18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(v).
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Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
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Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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the person against whom the seizure would be ordered has actual possession
of the trade secret.170
After the seizure, any materials seized will be taken into the custody of
the court, and the court shall secure the seized material from physical and
electronic access during the seizure and while in the court’s custody.171 If
the seized material includes a storage medium or is stored on a storage
medium, the medium will not be connected to a network or the Internet
without the consent of both parties.172 The court will take appropriate
measures to protect the confidentiality of seized materials that are unrelated
to the trade secret information ordered seized, unless the person against
whom the order is entered consents to disclosure of the material.173 Finally,
“[t]he court may appoint a special master to locate and isolate all
misappropriated trade secret information and to facilitate the return of
unrelated property and data to the person from whom the property was
seized.”174 In addition, the special master will be bound by a non-disclosure
agreement approved by the court.175
A finding of trade secret misappropriation can also result in monetary
damages.176 These monetary damages can come in three forms. First, they
may equate to lost profits.177 Second, the damages can reflect unjust
enrichment.178 Third, monetary damages can be in the amount of a
reasonable royalty that may have been due had the trade secret been licensed
for use.179 However, in the EU, if an employee does not act with intent,
member states have the ability to limit employees’ damages.180 The
Directive does not explicitly address punitive damages, but the DTSA allows
for punitive damages up to twice the amount awarded if the misappropriation
was willful and malicious.181
On the other hand, if a court finds that a plaintiff brought a trade secret
misappropriation claim in bad faith, both the DTSA and Directive provide
for specific sanctions. In the United States, the defendant may be awarded
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Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V)(aa).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(i).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(ii).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iii).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv).
Id.
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)–(ii); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)(I); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)(II); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(ii); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C).
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attorney’s fees if a claim is brought in bad faith.182 Further, if a defendant
opposed a motion to terminate an injunction in bad faith, the DTSA may
award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.183 Similarly, the Directive allows for
individual member states to impose sanctions on a plaintiff or award
damages to the defendant.184
In addition to monetary damages, judicial authorities can award
permanent equitable relief. When there has been an unlawful acquisition,
use, or disclosure of a trade secret, a European court has a few options. It
may order:
(a) the cessation of or . . . the prohibition of the use or
disclosure of the trade secret; (b) the prohibition of production,
offering, placing on the market or use of infringing goods, or
the importation, export, or storage of infringing goods for these
purposes; (c) the adoption of the appropriate corrective
measures with regard to the infringing goods; [or] (4) the
destruction of all or part of any document, object, material,
substance or electronic file containing or embodying the trade
secret or, where appropriate, the delivery up to the applicant of
all or part of those documents, objects, materials, substances, or
electronic files.185
In the United States, permanent relief includes an injunction.186 Both
jurisdictions allow for the payment of a reasonable royalty in lieu of an
injunction.187 However, the United States permits this only in exceptional
circumstances, and the EU allows this only when conditions are met
including lack of intent, disproportionate harm, or if the royalty appears
satisfactory.188
Though the remedies in both the EU and United States are similar, the EU
provides guidelines for revoking these remedies. The first is failure to
institute legal proceedings.189 Temporary remedies can also be removed if
there is no unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure found.190 Both temporary
and permanent remedies can be revoked at the request of the respondent if
182
183
184
185
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188
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18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D).
Id.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 16.
Id. at 15.
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(ii); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 7.
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(iii); Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 6–7.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 14.
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the information is no longer a trade secret for reasons not attributable to the
respondents.191
A fundamental difference between the two regimes is seen in regards to
criminal liability. Although not a part of the DTSA, the United States allows
for potential criminal liability for wrongful acquisition, use, or disclosure
under the Economic Espionage Act.192 Remedies include fines, forfeiture of
property, destruction of property, restitution to victim, and imprisonment.193
There is no criminal liability under the Directive. However, individual
member states may choose to have more “far-seeking protection” and enact
criminal sanctions within their own jurisdiction that are aligned with the
protections dictated by the Directive.194
Another issue that will be determined by individual states in the EU is the
statute of limitations. The United States statute of limitations period only
lasts three years after the date on which the misappropriation is discovered or
should have been discovered.195 The Directive merely specifies that the
statute of limitations should not exceed six years.196 Each state will be able
to tailor the statute of limitations to a period shorter than six years.197 States
will also be able to specify when the statute of limitations begins to run.198
The DTSA grants federal courts jurisdiction over conduct that occurs
outside of the United States, which is not present in the Directive.199
However, the Directive only dictates a minimum level of protection so EU
states can choose to have their trade secrets legislation apply to conduct
outside of their territory, like the DTSA.
Both the EU and the United States also seem committed to ensuring that
the DTSA and Directive are properly implemented. In the Directive, the
European Commission cited certain requirements for member states. First,
each member state is required to appoint at least one national correspondent
“for any question relation to the implementation of the measures provided for
The national correspondents are required to
by [the] Directive.”200
communicate details to other member states and the European Commission
regarding how their country is implementing the measures required by the
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Id.
Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996).
18 U.S.C. § 1832(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1834.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 8.
130 Stat. 376.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 12.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1837.
Trade Secrets Directive, supra note 81, at 17.
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Directive.201 Further, the European Union seems committed to monitoring
the effects of the Directive. The European Union Intellectual Property
Office must prepare a report on the litigation trends “regarding the unlawful
acquisition, use or disclosure of trade secrets pursuant to” the Directive.202
Then, by June 2022, the European Commission must submit an intermediate
report on the application of the Directive to the European Parliament and
Council.203 The purpose of that report is to analyze the effects of the
Directive on “research and innovation, the mobility of employees and on the
exercise of the right to freedom of expression and information.”204 The
European Commission will submit a final report evaluating the impact of the
Directive to the European Parliament and Council by June 9, 2026.205 After
member states implement “laws, regulations, and administrative provisions”
necessary to comply with the Directive, they must communicate the text of
the measures to the European Commission.206 The measures should also
contain reference to the Directive.207 In the United States, two years after the
DTSA’s enactment, the Federal Judicial Center is required to develop
recommended best practices.208 These best practices concern “the seizure of
information and media storing the information and the securing of
information and media once seized.”209 Further, those best practices have to
be updated periodically.210
V. EFFECT OF LEGISLATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES
Despite the similarities between the two pieces of legislation, the effects
will prove to be drastically different in each regime. The implementation of
the DTSA will likely experience few hurdles, primarily because of the
United States’ strong history of protecting trade secrets through the UTSA.
On the other hand, there will be greater challenges with implementation in
the EU for two reasons. First, effective implementation will require
coordination between countries. Second, there are unanswered questions
surrounding the Directive.
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Id. at 17–18.
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Id. at 18.
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Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
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A. Implementation and Effects of the Trade Secrets Directive in the
European Union
To begin with, the effects of the DTSA and the Directive will differ
because of the nature of the documents. The DTSA is U.S. legislation,
whereas the EU document is a directive. As such, the Directive does not
have the same binding effect as the DTSA. A directive is a “legislative act
that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve.”211 If the document
was a “regulation,” it would serve as a binding legislative act applicable to
the entire EU.212 However, with a directive, the EU defines a set of
standards that each country should then implement. The Directive allows
flexibility regarding statute of limitations and criminal liability.213 This
flexibility, in turn, will lead to stronger trade secret protection in some
countries.
Across the board, trade secret litigation is bound to increase in the EU;
however, the increased litigation will raise unanswered questions.214 Though
the Directive does not explicitly address jurisdictional issues, these will often
arise in the Directive’s implementation. Generally, domicile of the
defendant determines jurisdiction.215 Historically, this likely served as a
deterrent for trade secret claims because if the defendant lived in a state that
did not offer trade secret protection, the trade secret owner was better off not
bringing the claim at all because of the risk that the trade secret would be
revealed during the litigation process. In the EU, a plaintiff can bring a
claim related to a contractual obligation in the place of performance of that
obligation.216 Because of the Directive, any employee who was obliged to
preserve a trade secret as part of their employment contract is now subject to
suit in their former state of employment.
Thus, if an employee
misappropriates a trade secret and then moves to a new country, they will
still be subject to a civil suit. The amount of trade secret litigation is likely to
increase in nations that are more developed and industrial than others; for
211
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instance, Germany will likely see an increase in trade secret litigation. If a
trade secret owner brings any action for damages, the courts of the state
where the harmful event occurred can hear the case.217 However, the place
where the event giving rise to the liability occurred may differ from the place
where the event results in damage—for instance, if a trade secret is stolen in
Germany and then used in Latvia, an issue will arise as to which is the
harmful event—the actual theft or the use. The EU guidelines state that if
the events giving rise to liability in tort occurred in different states, the
plaintiff is free to choose a court from those member states.218 Facially, this
guideline will not increase forum shopping as litigants in the EU will know
that they will receive a minimal amount of protection regardless of what state
they litigate in. The Directive, however, gives countries flexibility to
harshen provisions, devise criminal sanctions, and modify statutes of
limitations for trade secret misappropriation. Thus, if states do not uniformly
implement the Directive, there may be an increase in forum shopping as it
relates to trade secrets. In this case, a plaintiff would be able to argue that
the harmful effects are widespread because of reduced sales, particularly if
their products or services are sold in a number of countries. Plaintiffs will
likely attempt to devise a strong argument that the harm is far reaching in
order to obtain jurisdiction in the country that provides the best trade secret
protection.
The jurisdictional guidelines do provide some limits: if the trade secret
relates to immoveable property, the trade secret litigation can only be
brought in the member state where the property is situated.219 Another
unknown issue deals with whether trade secrets will be considered under the
same category as patents and trademarks. If so, the guidelines provide that in
matters relating to rights that have been registered such as patents or
trademarks, the courts of the member state in which the registration has taken
place are exclusively competent.220 Trade secrets are not registered
intellectual property; thus, it would only be logical for this constraint to be
inapplicable to the Directive.
The Directive may also lead to choice of court agreements in employment
contracts as parties may have the possibility of choosing the member state
with jurisdiction.221 If a widespread corporation based in the European
Union knows that it has trade secret information that is used in multiple
jurisdictions, the company may choose to have employees sign contracts
217
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220
221

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

506

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

4/18/2018 9:21 AM

[Vol. 46:481

dictating where the trade secret misappropriation claim will be litigated to
receive the most protection or a longer statute of limitations.
Prior to the Directive, the prospect of bringing a trade secret
misappropriation claim was costly. Before even contemplating the costs of
litigation, a trade secret owner would have to spend time and money to
identify whether the information was protectable as a trade secret in a
particular member state.222 After doing so, the enforcement of trade secret
litigation was difficult and costly to handle.223 Now, however, there is
uniformity across all member states as to what sort of information is
protected as a trade secret, reducing the pre-litigation costs. Further, the
procedure for maintaining the secrecy of the information is now consistent
among member states. The decreased costs coupled with the increased
protection of information throughout the course of litigation will lead to
many more claims for trade secret misappropriation.
Most significantly, there were fewer trade secret claims brought in years
past because the fragmentation in laws created the possibility that a trade
secret could be leaked during a court proceeding.224 That problem will be
ameliorated as member states implement legislation guided by the Directive.
Prior to the Directive, a plaintiff typically had to substantiate his or her claim
by disclosing the allegedly infringed secret.225 Now, a plaintiff does not have
to fear this unwanted disclosure. This will ultimately lead to more trade
secret claims, particularly from the pharmaceutical, automotive, information
technology, and chemical companies. Further, it was generally impossible to
enforce a trade secret against a third party who obtained the information in
good faith.226 The Directive will allow those claims, though it will limit
damages.
The European Union countries will encounter problems in ensuring
uniform implementation of trade secret legislation. First, there will be
problems ensuring that each country is implementing legislation that
corresponds with other member countries to prevent diverging results.227
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Another problem will be ensuring that countries are applying their respective
legislation such that there is uniformity and comparable protection among
EU states.228 To help alleviate this situation, the European Union has
recommended that countries meet with each other to discuss their
legislation.229 Ultimately, however, each country has control over its
legislation and does not have to follow the actions of another country.
In response to the issues regarding uniform implementation, the European
Commission states that member states will receive support services from the
European Commission and that national best practices will help other
member states.230 This fact supports the inference that certain countries that
already have strong trade secret protection will prove to be leaders in the EU.
A country that already has strong trade secret protection will have less work
to do to implement the Directive. Further, since that country has a history of
strong trade secret protection, others will likely follow their lead. Judicial
authorities will have the role of ensuring the uniform protection of trade
secrets.231 A key issue for judicial authorities will be carrying “out a
proportionate enforcement of the rules and ensuring that there are no material
divergences among different judicial authorities.”232 This is a vital
component of the implementation of the Trade Secrets Directive, failure to
do this may lead to forum shopping.
Ultimately, the Directive in the EU will do what the UTSA did for the
states in the United States. The legal framework will provide greater clarity
on the remedies available to trade secret owners. The Directive will also
lead to deterrence.233 Notably, the Directive provides a greater amount of
detail than the DTSA. The Directive contains greater detail regarding
remedies for trade secret misappropriation, factors courts should take into
consideration when determining which remedies are appropriate, and steps
the court should take to ensure confidentiality of the trade secret information.
The Directive requires more detail than the DTSA because all states in the
United States have had experience with trade secret claims, and federal
courts are also experienced with trade secret claims through diversity suits.
Both the pre-existing guidelines in the UTSA and case law in the United
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0493&from=en
[hereinafter Commission Staff Working Document].
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States provide detailed information about trade secret claims, such that the
information did not need to be included in the DTSA. In contrast, some
countries in the EU had no experience with trade secret claims. As such,
those countries required more guidance about trade secrets which explains
why the Directive is far more intricate than the DTSA.
B. Implementation and Effects of the Defend Trade Secrets Act in the United
States
While the Directive will have a profound impact on trade secret litigation
in the EU, trade secret litigation in the United States will remain largely the
same. Though a primary rationale in favor of enacting the Defend Trade
Secrets Act was that it would lead to state law uniformity,234 the new federal
legislation will likely have little effect on uniformity. First, a majority of
states already have uniform approaches to trade secrets litigation because
forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA. Though each state has been able
to modify aspects of the UTSA, the protection of trade secrets was mostly
the same among the states that adopted the UTSA.235 The definition of
misappropriation in the DTSA and the UTSA is identical236 so the DTSA
does not create a revolutionary definition of a trade secret, unlike in Europe
where many states will have to define a trade secret for the first time.
Further, the remedial provisions of the DTSA are similar to those that exist
under state law.237
The DTSA offers better protection because it allows trade secret claims to
be heard in either state or federal court. This is particularly important given
the time sensitive nature of trade secrets. First, federal courts in recent years
have experienced a backlog of cases slowing the time it takes to resolve a
case.238 The average time to take a civil case through trial in some districts is
over three years.239 Trade secrets are an important business tool for
companies, and it is unlikely that a business would want to be involved in
litigation for years. Thus, if a company knows that their federal district court
is experiencing backlog, they will choose to bring the claim in state court.
234
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This flexibility allows trade secret owners to have their cases resolved in the
most expedient way possible.
The DTSA improves trade secret protection in the United States because
trade secret owners can choose if they want to bring their claim in federal
court and avail themselves of certain advantages that only exist in federal
court. Federal judges have more experience with intellectual property
disputes than state court judges given the federal court’s exclusive
jurisdiction over other forms of intellectual property such as trademarks,
copyrights, and patents. Defendants may also prefer federal court because
initial mandatory disclosures will help weed out false trade secrets claims. A
trade secret owner may also want to limit the exposure of their trade secret
information, given the value and sensitivity of the information. Federal
courts provide a better forum for achieving that goal as only one judge
handles the entire case, limiting the number of people exposed to the
information.
The federal court also has broader reach. State trade secret claims do not
allow for nationwide service of process. Further, it is more difficult to seek
discovery across state or national borders in state courts rather than federal
courts. Some litigants may choose to bring their claims in federal court to
take advantage of a less burdensome litigation process.
Most importantly, however, federal courts offer the option of ex parte
seizure. This is a distinct advantage to trade secret owners aiming to protect
the privacy of their vital business information. This provision is one that
many companies will choose to take advantage of, especially given the
advancement of technology and the ability to disseminate information widely
and quickly—a trade secret thief need only put information on the internet
for the potential of immitigable effects. Imagine if one of the two Coca-Cola
executives with knowledge of Coca-Cola’s top secret formula goes rogue
and posts that recipe to the internet or e-mails the recipe to all of the contacts
in his address book; Coca-Cola would lose its competitive advantage in the
market. The very nature of a trade secret is that it is not well known, and
once that information is widely disseminated, it is no longer a trade secret.
Aiming to avoid that doomsday scenario, companies will seek to have any
and all property that may contain the trade secret seized by the court and
protected until trial. This remedy is not available in state court and is further
evidence that the DTSA will lead to a substantial increase in the number of
trade secret claims heard in federal courts in lieu of state courts.
It is worth noting that a majority of the trade secret owners who aim to
take advantage of the ex parte seizure will probably believe that they have a
viable claim. The DTSA calls for the trade secret holder to pay a security
bond that will cover damages in the event the court later finds that the
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seizure was unnecessary or caused harm. Because a plaintiff is required to
provide money at the outset, a plaintiff will not waste money as a means to
prevent competition. This provision may help quell concerns about frivolous
litigation under the DTSA.
The potential to receive treble damages and attorney’s fees will also
increase federal trade secret claims. If a trade secret owner believes that the
trade secret was misappropriated with intent, as opposed to accidentally, they
may be more likely to bring the claim in federal court. The DTSA allows
exemplary damages of up to two times the amount of damages if the secret is
willfully and maliciously misappropriated.240
The statute of limitations is three years for both the UTSA and DTSA.
This similar statute of limitations will not lead to an increase in federal trade
secret claims because there is no extra time to bring a claim under the DTSA.
Similarly, the number of trade secret cases heard in EU countries will also
increase. Generally, in EU countries, fewer trade secret cases were heard
relative to patent and other intellectual property cases.241 This low number
of cases was likely due to a lack of legislation in many countries governing
trade secret misappropriation. For now, however, trade secret owners
recognize that because of the Directive, they will receive a minimum level of
protection across all countries, thereby increasing the likelihood that a trade
secret owner may bring a misappropriation claim.
Finally, the Directive and DTSA will have a significant effect on the
relations between EU countries and the United States. Historically, the
Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community and
the United States of America established an agreement on trade secrets such
that the two regimes agreed to maintain confidentiality of information
including trade secrets.242 Though this agreement established a right to
protection, American trade secrets would have received less protection
because of the weaker trade secret laws in the EU.243 Now, however,
because the Directive provides more protection in line with prior U.S.
protection, the agreement carries more weight.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, though the DTSA and Directive have a significant number
of similarities, ultimately, the results will be far different. The DTSA will
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lead to little change in the protection of trade secrets in the United States.
On the other hand, the impact on the EU will be dramatic.
The EU is lagging behind the United States in terms of trade secret
protection. Whereas the United States has moved to harmonize trade secret
legislation on a federal level while there is already some protection at the
state level, the EU Trade Secrets Directive will do for the EU what the
UTSA did for the United States. While all EU member countries will have
some form of trade secret protection, that protection will vary from country
to country.
While the United States has a strong history of protecting trade secrets at
the state level through the UTSA, no such guidance existed in the European
Union. Thus, the Directive, in some ways, serves as a guiding document,
much like the publication of the UTSA did. There will be problems in
implementing the EU Trade Secrets Directive and ultimately, the Directive
will not lead to consistency in trade secret protection.
There will not be uniform protection because it is up to each country’s
legislature to design its individual legislation. Given the history of trade
secrets, some countries will place more emphasis on the protection of trade
secrets whereas other countries will let the protections fall by the wayside.
Further, the Directive provides a great deal of discretion to judicial
authorities in the protection of trade secrets, especially with regard to
seizures. The judges will probably be affected by their past interactions with
trade secret cases and the general attitudes surrounding the protection of
trade secrets. Judges who do not understand the nuances associated with
trade secrets and the importance they hold are less likely to grant ex parte
seizures. This does not differ from the United States where judges will be
given a significant amount of discretion as well.
The United States also has stronger trade secret protection because it
allows for ex parte seizures. The fact that a seizure can be ex parte is crucial.
If a trade secret thief is put on notice that they will be taken to court to
defend against alleged trade secret theft, the thief will be more likely to pull
the trigger and disseminate the information before they are held legally
accountable; especially if the trade secret thief is seeking revenge or
expecting a large amount of monetary compensation. The EU Directive does
not specify if seizure can be ex parte which probably means that each
respective country will be permitted to make this decision. Again, because
each country has its own ability to shape its legislation, individual results
will differ.
The DTSA also applies to extraterritorial conduct which is important for
trade secrets that may be misappropriated abroad. This is particularly
important as an administration report showed that in many cases of trade
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secret theft, the purchaser of the trade secret was either the Chinese
government or a company in China.244 The Directive does not say anything
about extraterritorial conduct, and each country will have to decide how it
will treat this type of conduct. If, however, the legislation does not apply to
extraterritorial conduct, it will be ineffective. The trade secret legislation
only applies to domestic misappropriation; however, given the size of the EU
and the ease of transportation, it is very easy to transport information across
country lines. Thus, to ensure strong protection, it is important that EU
countries recognize that their legislation should apply to extraterritorial
conduct. Again, this variable shows that EU trade secret protection may not
be as strong because some countries may choose to limit their legislation to
domestic misappropriation and there will be a lack of uniformity from
country to country.
Another factor that supports the argument that trade secret protection is
stronger in the United States than the EU is the fact that the United States
imposes criminal liability upon a trade secret thief. This is particularly
important at the company level. Without the risk of criminal liability, a lowlevel employee may be inclined to steal a trade secret knowing that if he or
she is caught, they will only be liable for damages. However, the low-level
employee may know that he or she does not have the ability to pay damages,
so there is no real deterrent. However, if a low-level employee knows that
she can face jail time if caught stealing a trade secret, she may think twice
before conducting the criminal act. EU states can choose to criminalize trade
secret misappropriation in each state’s legislation. Because only some
countries will likely criminalize trade secret misappropriation, some
countries in the EU will continue to be known for their strong trade secret
protection whereas some may lag behind.
Finally, trade secret protection will remain stronger in the United States
because opposing parties will not have access to the trade secret information.
In contrast, in the EU, a party may have access to the information. This will
have the effect of leading to false claims of trade secret theft. For instance,
Company A may wonder if Company B has any trade secret information.
Company A could bring a claim for trade secret theft and hedge their bets as
to whether Company B has any information. When in court, Company A will
gain access to Company B’s information. Essentially, this is a form of
corporate espionage. However, major corporations may bear the costs of
litigation in order to find out information that has even more potential value.
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Though the EU has taken steps to equalize trade secret protection
throughout EU countries, there are many variables that will result in
inconsistent protection, though trade secrets will be better protected than they
were prior to the Directive. The trade secret protection in the United States
will remain strong due to uniform laws and multiple forums to bring
misappropriation claims arising under those laws.

